Navigating life in Mu empire and anywhere globally requires strategic social, economic, political and collective maneuver.

Lobbying tended to focus attention on public office holders within the existing the power sanctum with executive branch gaining prominence than legislative branch with executive lobbying relations, treating the executive and lobbyists as two homogeneous groups despite the glaring differences.

With executive made up of executive's political creame, partisans, advisors and nonpartisan bureaucrats who vary in the skills, motivations, responsibilities and Power within government.

The difference also existed in the level of expertise and political representativeness between in-house and consultant lobbyists.

Executive- lobbying nexus is qualified by number of contacts consultants and in-house lobbyists have with different executive personnel — ministers, partisan advisor, senior public servant and no service public servants.

There was substantive variation in lobbying intensity between upper and lower ranked executive personnel in-house lobbyists lobbying senior political and senior administrative personnel.

Within the executive, there was substantive variation in lobbying intensity between upper and lower ranked executive personnel; in-house lobbyists lobbying senior political and senior administrative personnel twice as much as consultant lobbyists.

Governor Atisto's executive had great deal of control over assembly's agenda in devolution with lobbyists focusing their attention on the executive to the neglect of the legislative branch. Lobbyists target executive public office holders more than legislative personnel.

Executive focused lobbying wasn't unidimensional dyad but multifaceted with varying executive lobbyist relationship stemming from differences among executive public office holders as well as among lobbyists.

There executive Nexus included appointed ministers, partisan advisors, senior public servants and non- senior public servants all of whom had varying skills, motivation, responsibility, accountability and Power within executive.

In-house lobbyists were distinguished from consultants who varied in their expertise, governmental connection and political representativeness.

The contact between in-house and consultant lobbyists have with minister, partisan, advisor, top ranking public servants — Chief officers, directors, advisors, top ranking public servants and non- senior public servants.

There was substantive difference in nature of executive lobbyist relationship. Specifically, lobbying target top ranking executive personnel — minister and senior public servants which was predominantly undertaken by in-house consultants whereas lobbying contacting lower rank partisan advisors and no senior public servants are largely undertaken by consultant lobbyists.

The general argument was that executive lobbying relationship was not unidimensional with meaningful variation in the intensity with which different categories of executive public office holders meet different types of lobbyists. At a more specific level, however variation in the executive lobbying relationship did not stem from differences between partisan- political and administrative personnel rather the variation observed was consistent with difference stemming from logic of access between top ranking executive and public servants vs lower ranking political - partisan and administrative Staff.

The distinction between members of the executive government is between elected politicians, appointed partisan advisors and nonpartisan career public servants. On one hand, from classical understanding of Westminster administrative traditions distinguishing between these actors, should not make much difference when it comes to understanding the executive - lobbying relationship which might be understood as unidimensional dyad between executive personnel and lobbyists.

Traditional list of policy advisory system in Westminster countries consider partisan advisors as holding the same interest as politicians. In Westminster countries, partisan advisors are nominated by their respective ministers and like ministers their position within the executive is generally only ascertain as that of the elected politician for whom they work.

Partisan advisors have incentives to please electorates, just like ministers, enough that ensures that government is returned to power. The nature of partisan advisors' work is also more partisan than that of impartial public servants.

Accordingly, for lobbyists to speak to a partisan advisor would be very similar to speaking to the partisan advisor's respective minister. In summary, lobbyist would be tempted to display similar behavior towards partisan advisor as they do toward ministers.

Westminster public administration's literature suggests that distinguishing between public servants and politicians might not make much difference for lobbyists. It is postulated that public service in Westminster parliamentary countries has no constitutional personality or responsibility separate for the dully elected government of the day.

In contrast to the presidential political system, the public service in Westminster countries doesn't have an independent identity nor any independent political legitimacy from elected government. Alternatively refered to as an agency- type public service bargain by some scholars according to traditional perspective, the public service in Westminster countries is also politically neutral instrument that impartially implement the elected executive governing agenda.

It is possible that for lobbyists, speaking to a public servant, rather than the minister, is equivalent to speaking to an impartial agent rather than speaking to principals themselves.

Accordingly, the traditional understanding of partisan advisor there might not be much difference in lobbying behavior focusing on public servant and minister.

The more recent work in public administration, public policy and political science, including lobbying venue choice literatures provide good theoretical reasons to expect that differing categories of personnel within the executive as well as different types lobbyists might matter and influence the nature of the relationship they have with one another.

Differences in the skills, motivation, responsibilities and Power among executive personnel lead to two overarching theoretical expectations: Partaning to the politics - administration dichotomy and the other partaning to logic of access.

The primary difference among executive public office holder concerns the professional incentives of politicians, partisan advisors and public servants. Of utmost importance, politicians within the executive are elected by the people, whereas partisan advisors and public servants aren't.

Partisan advisors are appointed by ministers, meanwhile among public servants, the very top positions are appointed by first minister, with the appointment of public servants below the top rank overseen by public service itself.  Importantly, Westminster governments have increasingly politicized top ranking bureaucratic appointments by supplanting merit criteria with political responsiveness to the government's policy agenda, comparative studies suggest that on the whole, the high ranks of the public service in Westminster countries still reflect the principle of merit recruitment.

Although one important characteristic among senior public servants is their closer proximity to the political realm of governing with respect to working alongside ministers and their lower ranking public servants. Whereas political considerations are an inescapable aspect of senior public servants, most Westminster countries are still mindful of upholding impartiality and not becoming overly political - partisan actors.

In summary, the career incentives for public servants in Westminster countries is not as electorally oriented as politicians and partisan advisors who will be more influenced by electorates' opinion; rather with their appointment and promotion decisions being isolated from electoral politics, public servants' incentives are directed to professional norms and standards.

In addition to politicians and partisan advisors having stronger electorally influenced career incentives than public servants, another difference among executive personnel is the permanency of their position because their position within executive is contingent on being returned to power at the next election, the temporal vision of politicians and their partisan advisors tends to be more oriented towards the short-term than public servants, who can expect to spend entire career within the public service.

Politicians have higher degree of political legitimacy than partisan advisors and public servants because they are elected by people. A decision by an elected politician within the executive has a higher degree of political legitimacy not only because they're an elected representatives of the people but because of the principle of ministerial responsibility within parliamentary system of government . Ministers are politically accountable before the legislative branch of government. In contrast, within the Westminster administrative system, partisan advisors and career public servants have no such political legitimacy to make decisions nor are they politically accountable before parliament for the actions of their departments.

Finally, politicians have less policy expertise than career public servants who, especially within Westminster administrative countries are generally appointed and promoted according to merit. Also of note is that while partisan advisors are more political than career public servants, another school of thought maintains that partisan advisors can have a high degree of policy relevant expertise and are directly involved in the development of policies.

Given the mentioned differences in incentives, expertise and political legitimacy, it might be the case that lobbyists tend to have different relationship with career public servants and politicians. For instance, given politicians' legitimacy and power within the executive, lobbyists might seek out these individuals rather than career public servants. On the other hand , however, given the greater expertise and permanence of public servants, lobbyists may wish to speak to these actors to discuss the technical details of policies and programs as well as to foster long-term relationships with more stable members of executive.

Meanwhile, because partisan advisors have similar electoral incentives as politicians but can also have higher level of policy relevant expertise, they may present themselves as an attractive hybrid to lobbyists straddling some aspects of politicians (electorally minded, indirect political legitimacy) and career public servants ( issue expertise). Such a possibility is consistent with examination of differences between elected and inelected public office holders. Lobbyists who are able to brokerage different interests have more access with elected officials, while such a political skill doesn't affect an actor's ability to access administrative personnel. The lobbyist contact with public servants were largely due to entrenched routine behavior. The uncertainty about which party will form government in the future is positively related to contacting public servants. The increase in uncertainty among policy makers about technical details of issues leads to increase in number of contacts lobbyists had with administrative personnel.

The difference among lobbyists also play a factor in shaping executive- lobbying relationship just like the case with executive personnel. Like executive public officers, not all lobbyists are the same. They also vary in their incentives and professional skills.

In-house and consultant is one such difference. In-house lobbyists are employees of the organizations for whom they lobby the government. Because in-house lobbyists tend to work for same organization for along period, they posses a high degree of expertise in the policy sector relevant to their organization. Accordingly, in-house lobbyists are favourably situated to develop long-term relationships with executive government personnel not only because they're permanent employees of their organizations but also because in-house lobbyists only lobby on behalf of one organization with restricted interest, they are likely to contact a limited number of government agencies, in contrast to consultant lobbyists who will lobby awide and diverse range of government agencies contingent on who hires them for their services. As such, in-house lobbyists might be prone to develop relationship with career public servants who posses and whose work requires expertise and whose career, being isolated from electoral influence, is also favourable to developing long lasting relationships.

The other difference between in-house and consultant lobbyists that might be an important factor for executive personnel is their Political representativeness which is a valuable currency when it comes to lobbying the government. The more the actors can claim that they represent the interest of a segment of the population, the more their voices will be of interest to policy makers. Importantly, in-house lobbyists may posses a higher level of political representativeness than consultant lobbyists for two reasons:

First , as permanent employees of the organization for whom they lobby the government, in-house lobbyists have stronger tie to their organization than the tie consultant lobbyists have to the organizations they lobby on behalf of.

Stemming from being a permanent employee for their organizations, in-house lobbyists are likely to have stronger connections to other organizations and lobbyists within their respective interest sector. As such in-house lobbyists might not only posses more political representativeness with respect to their organizations ,but might also posses greater representativeness with respect to the larger policy network their organization found itself within.

Secondly, it has been noted that possessing representativeness before government officials is not only about being able to represent the interest of large group actors but there's also a social dynamic to representativeness. As permanent employees, in-house lobbyists have the advantage of fostering longstanding relationship with government officials and therein increase their representativeness in the eyes of executive personnel.

A consultant lobbyist, however is not an official employee of the organization for whom they lobby the government on behalf of. Consultant lobbyists are professionals lobbyists who offer their services to any organization. Rather than having in-depth expertise with respect to specific organization and the policy sector related to the organization, consultant lobbyists have been described as well connected chameleons who have preexisting relationship with government personnel. Consultant lobbyists are also more likely to be revolving-door lobbyists. Being former public office holders — often public servants or partisan advisors, but sometimes also politician , revolving-door lobbyists use their knowledge of political bureaucratic system and their connection with government personnel to lobby the government on behalf of any paying customer.

In summary, based on the previous analysis, there is need to go beyond approaching executive lobbying relentlessly as a unidimensional dyad composed of two homogeneous groups and to instead consider varieties in executive-lobbying relationship stemming from differences in the nature of executive public office holders and lobbyists.